In a series of internal communications that were obtained by the U.S. Department of Justice, officials from the military branch of Hamas – the organization that governs the Gaza Strip and is designated as a terrorist group by the United States, the European Union, and many other jurisdictions – have explicitly warned their financial backers to steer clear of Binance, one of the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchanges. The messages, which were part of a broader investigation into how the group raises, moves, and launders money, specifically name Bybit, OKX, Kast and Redotpay as preferred alternatives for handling donations and other monetary inflows. The guidance appears to be a direct response to heightened scrutiny of Binance by regulators worldwide.
In recent months, Binance has faced a cascade of legal challenges, ranging from allegations of inadequate anti‑money‑laundering (AML) controls to investigations by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).
These pressures have prompted a wave of users – both legitimate and illicit – to explore other platforms that may offer looser compliance regimes or simply less public attention. According to the DOJ files, Hamas’ military wing—often referred to as the Izz ad‑Din al‑Qassam Brigades—issued a set of operational directives to its network of sympathizers and financiers.
The documents outline a clear preference hierarchy: Bybit and OKX are highlighted as the primary venues for converting fiat currency into digital assets, while Kast and Redotpay are mentioned as secondary options for moving those assets across borders. The language used in the communications is pragmatic, focusing on speed, anonymity, and the perceived lower risk of detection.
Bybit, a Singapore‑based exchange that has rapidly expanded its user base since its launch in 2018, is praised for its user‑friendly interface and relatively low transaction fees. OKX, formerly known as OKEx and headquartered in Malta, is noted for its deep liquidity pools and a wide range of trading pairs, which can be advantageous for converting large sums without triggering market alarms.
Kast, a less well‑known platform that operates primarily in the Middle East, is recommended for its localized support and the ability to process transactions in Arabic, which the group cites as a convenience for donors in the region. Redotpay, a payment gateway that facilitates crypto‑to‑fiat conversions, is suggested as a final step for moving funds into more traditional banking channels. The shift away from Binance is not merely a matter of preference; it reflects a strategic calculation about regulatory risk.
Binance, despite its massive scale, has been forced to tighten its compliance frameworks after being placed on watchlists by several governments. The DOJ documents indicate that Hamas’ operatives are acutely aware of the potential for account freezes, asset seizures, or even criminal investigations that could arise if they continue to rely on a platform under intense regulatory pressure.
In addition to the operational details, the DOJ files provide insight into the broader financial ecosystem that sustains Hamas’ military activities. The group’s fundraising apparatus is highly diversified, encompassing traditional charitable fronts, private donations from diaspora communities, and increasingly sophisticated crypto‑based schemes. By leveraging the pseudonymous nature of blockchain transactions, Hamas can obscure the origin and destination of funds, making it more difficult for law‑enforcement agencies to trace the money trail.
Experts in counter‑terrorism finance note that the adoption of multiple crypto exchanges serves a dual purpose. First, it spreads risk: if one platform is compromised or shut down, the organization can quickly pivot to another without losing access to its financial lifeline. Second, it exploits the fragmented regulatory landscape of the crypto industry, where oversight varies dramatically from one jurisdiction to another.
This patchwork environment allows illicit actors to cherry‑pick the most permissive venues for their operations. The recommendation to use Bybit, OKX, Kast and Redotpay also underscores a growing trend among extremist groups to professionalize their financial operations. Rather than relying solely on cash couriers or informal hawala networks, these groups are increasingly adopting digital tools that provide greater efficiency and scalability.
The DOJ’s disclosure suggests that Hamas’ military wing has dedicated personnel whose role is to monitor regulatory developments, test new platforms, and issue guidance to donors in real time. From a policy perspective, the revelations raise several challenges for regulators and intelligence agencies. Traditional AML frameworks are often ill‑equipped to handle the speed and anonymity of crypto transactions, especially when they occur across multiple platforms with differing compliance standards.
Moreover, the cross‑border nature of cryptocurrency means that a single national authority may have limited leverage over an exchange that is incorporated elsewhere. In response, several governments have begun to coordinate more closely on crypto‑related enforcement. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has issued guidance urging member states to apply the same AML and counter‑terrorist financing (CTF) standards to virtual asset service providers (VASPs) as they do to banks and other financial institutions.
The United States, through FinCEN, has proposed new rules that would require crypto exchanges to collect more detailed information about their users and to report suspicious activity more promptly. Nevertheless, the adaptability demonstrated by Hamas’ military wing suggests that any regulatory crackdown will likely be met with rapid migration to alternative platforms. The DOJ’s documents serve as a reminder that combating the financing of terrorism in the digital age requires not only robust legal tools but also technical expertise, international cooperation, and a willingness to keep pace with the evolving tactics of illicit actors.
In summary, the internal Hamas communications reveal a calculated move away from Binance toward Bybit, OKX, Kast and Redotpay, driven by concerns over regulatory exposure and the desire for greater operational flexibility. The shift highlights the growing sophistication of terrorist financing networks as they increasingly harness cryptocurrency to fund their activities. As governments worldwide intensify their scrutiny of crypto exchanges, the cat‑and‑mouse game between regulators and illicit users is set to continue, with each side constantly adapting to the other's moves.