The Arbitrum Security Council has taken swift action to freeze a substantial portion of the funds tied to the Kelp DAO exploit. On Monday, the council successfully moved 30,766 ETH, valued at around $71 million, into a secure intermediary wallet. This wallet can only be accessed through additional governance actions, effectively putting the funds out of reach of the exploiter.
The action was taken in collaboration with law enforcement, which provided crucial input regarding the identity of the exploiter. The Security Council emphasized that this move was executed without disrupting any Arbitrum users or applications.
The transfer was completed at 11:26 p.m. ET on April 20, as announced by Arbitrum.
This development means that about a quarter of the total amount stolen from Kelp's LayerZero-powered bridge on Saturday has been recovered. The stolen funds, which were initially held in an address connected to the KelpDAO exploit, are no longer under the control of that address.
The incident began when attackers exploited compromised verifier infrastructure to drain 116,500 rsETH, with LayerZero attributing the attack to North Korea's Lazarus Group with preliminary confidence. Arbitrum, a layer-2 blockchain built on top of Ethereum, offers cheaper transaction processing and settlement back to the main chain. Its Security Council, comprising elected signers, has the emergency power to take protective measures in such scenarios.
However, interventions at the governance level on user funds are rare and contentious due to the discretionary control they introduce over an otherwise permissionless network. This freeze provides Kelp with a partial recovery option, in addition to any potential recoveries by law enforcement and chain-tracing firms. It also escalates the ongoing dispute between Kelp and LayerZero regarding responsibility for the exploit, as any broader socialization of remaining losses now has a $71 million offset.
Kelp is coordinating with ecosystem partners on a recovery fund and considering next steps, including unpausing, loss socialization, and legal coordination with affected counterparties. The possibility of freezing more stolen funds depends on the attacker's movements of rsETH or its derivatives and whether other chains with similar emergency powers choose to act.