A significant portion of the funds stolen from Kelp DAO is now frozen. Arbitrum's Security Council took swift action, securing approximately $71 million worth of ether on Monday evening by transferring 30,766 ETH into an intermediary wallet. This wallet can only be accessed through additional governance measures.

The frozen funds are linked to the $292 million rsETH exploit that occurred on Saturday. rsETH is a token representing a user's position in restaked ether and is issued by KelpDAO. The Security Council's decision to freeze the funds was made with input from law enforcement, who provided information about the exploiter's identity.

The council executed the freeze without disrupting any Arbitrum users or applications. According to Arbitrum's statement, the transfer was completed at 11:26 p.m. ET on April 20, and the stolen funds are no longer controlled by the original address. This move recovers about a quarter of the total amount drained from Kelp's LayerZero-powered bridge during the exploit.

The attack, which is attributed to North Korea's Lazarus Group with preliminary confidence, involved the exploitation of compromised verifier infrastructure, resulting in the theft of 116,500 rsETH. Arbitrum, a layer-2 blockchain built on top of Ethereum, has a Security Council with emergency powers to take protective action in such scenarios.

However, interventions on user funds at the governance level are rare and controversial due to the introduction of discretionary control over an otherwise permissionless network. The freeze provides Kelp with a partial recovery option, in addition to any further recoveries that law enforcement and chain-tracing firms may achieve.

It also escalates the ongoing dispute between Kelp and LayerZero regarding responsibility for the exploit, as any broader socialization of remaining losses now has a $71 million offset before legal coordination, insurance, or treasury contributions come into play. Kelp is currently coordinating with ecosystem partners on a recovery fund and weighing next steps on unpausing, loss socialization, and legal coordination with affected counterparties. The potential for freezing additional stolen funds depends on the movement of rsETH or its derivatives by the attacker before consolidation and whether other chains with similar emergency powers choose to act on their portions of the flow.