The aftermath of the KelpDAO exploit has led to a significant surge in borrowing on Aave, with users taking out approximately $300 million in loans against their USDT deposits in the first 24 hours following the attack, according to data from Chaos Labs. This sudden increase in borrowing is not driven by demand, but rather by users' inability to withdraw their funds due to maxed-out stablecoin pools. As a result, depositors are being forced to take out loans against their own funds at a loss, simply to access liquidity.
This desperate measure is a sign of the credit creation that occurs when users are unable to withdraw their deposits, much like a bank refusing to process customer fiat deposit withdrawal requests, prompting customers to take out loans on these deposits. The head of strategy at Spark, a rival DeFi lending platform, noted that the $300 million increase in borrowing with USDT collateral is a negative secondary effect of the illiquidity in Aave's stablecoin markets.
To understand how the KelpDAO exploit led to this liquidity crisis on Aave, it's essential to understand how the system is designed to work and where it failed. Aave is a decentralized finance protocol that enables users to lend and borrow cryptocurrencies without intermediaries, operating on the assumption that there is always sufficient liquidity for lenders to withdraw their deposits and for borrowers to unwind their positions. However, when this assumption breaks down, the entire system is affected. The KelpDAO exploit involved the manipulation of the protocol's bridge infrastructure, resulting in the release of 116,500 rsETH tokens, which were then used to borrow real ETH and other assets such as wrapped ether.
The fake tokens were deposited into lending protocols, mostly Aave, to borrow real assets. The exploit led to Aave freezing rsETH markets, which in turn triggered a chain reaction that resulted in the $300 million borrowing surge. As the news of the exploit broke, whales and big funds withdrew billions of dollars worth of cryptocurrencies from Aave's liquidity pools, draining the pools and causing utilization rates to rise to 100%. This meant that users could not withdraw their funds, prompting them to borrow against their locked deposits.
The trapped USDT and USDC depositors, unable to withdraw their money, began drawing loans from their locked deposits, accepting a loss of 10-25% just to extract any liquidity from the system. This desperate act of borrowing against their own money at a loss has reduced liquidity in other markets, with USDC and USDe markets now at 100% utilization. The incident highlights the risks associated with decentralized finance, demonstrating that 'decentralized' does not mean 'without risk'.