A significant portion of the funds stolen from Kelp DAO has been rendered inaccessible. On Monday, Arbitrum's Security Council successfully froze approximately $71 million worth of ether, moving 30,766 ETH into a secure intermediary wallet. This wallet can only be accessed through additional governance actions, effectively preventing the exploiter from utilizing the funds.

The frozen funds are connected to Saturday's $292 million rsETH exploit. rsETH is a token representing a user's position in restaked ether, issued by KelpDAO.

The Security Council's decision to freeze the funds was made in collaboration with law enforcement, who provided input on the exploiter's identity. The council executed the freeze without disrupting any Arbitrum users or applications. According to Arbitrum, the transfer was completed at 11:26 p.m. ET on April 20.

The stolen funds are no longer under the control of the original address. This move recovers about a quarter of the total amount drained from Kelp's LayerZero-powered bridge on Saturday.

The attack, attributed to North Korea's Lazarus Group, resulted in the exploitation of 116,500 rsETH. As a layer-2 blockchain, Arbitrum processes transactions more efficiently and settles them on the main Ethereum chain. Its Security Council has the authority to take emergency actions to protect the network. However, interventions on user funds are rare and often controversial due to the introduction of discretionary control.

The freeze provides Kelp with a partial recovery option, in addition to any potential recoveries through law enforcement and chain-tracing firms. The ongoing dispute between Kelp and LayerZero over responsibility for the exploit has been escalated, with the $71 million freeze potentially offsetting remaining losses.

Kelp is currently coordinating with ecosystem partners to establish a recovery fund and is considering next steps, including unpausing, loss socialization, and legal coordination with affected parties. The possibility of freezing additional stolen funds depends on the attacker's movements of rsETH or its derivatives and whether other chains with similar emergency powers choose to take action.