The recent KelpDAO hack has sent shockwaves through stablecoin markets, leading to a liquidity crisis on Aave. In the 24 hours following the attack, users borrowed around $300 million against their USDT deposits on the platform, according to data from Chaos Labs.

This surge in borrowing is not a sign of increased demand, but rather a desperate attempt by users to access liquidity. With stablecoin pools maxed out, depositors are taking out loans against their own funds at a loss, simply to access some form of liquidity. This phenomenon can be likened to a bank refusing to process customer fiat deposit withdrawal requests, prompting customers to take out loans on these deposits out of desperation.

The head of strategy at Spark, a rival DeFi lending platform, noted that the illiquidity in Aave's stablecoin markets has led to negative secondary effects, including the $300 million increase in borrowing with USDT collateral. To understand the cause of this liquidity crisis, it is essential to comprehend how Aave functions and where the system failed. Aave is a decentralized finance protocol that enables users to lend and borrow cryptocurrencies without intermediaries. It operates on the assumption that there is always sufficient liquidity in the lending pools for lenders to withdraw their deposits and for borrowers to unwind their positions.

However, when this assumption breaks down, the entire system is affected. The KelpDAO exploit, which involved the manipulation of the protocol's bridge infrastructure to release unbacked rsETH tokens, has had far-reaching consequences. These fake tokens were deposited into lending protocols, primarily Aave, to borrow real assets such as ETH and wETH.

The resulting freeze on rsETH markets on Aave's V3 and V4 has led to a chain reaction, causing the $300 million borrowing surge. The exploit led to a massive withdrawal of assets from Aave's liquidity pools, with whales and large funds withdrawing billions of dollars worth of cryptocurrencies within hours.

This drained the liquidity pools, causing the utilization rates of USDT and USDC pools to reach 100%. As a result, trapped depositors, unable to withdraw their money, have resorted to borrowing against their locked deposits at a loss, simply to extract any liquidity from the system. This desperate act of borrowing against their own money has reduced liquidity in other markets, with USDC and USDe markets now also at 100% utilization. The incident highlights the risks associated with decentralized finance, demonstrating that 'decentralized' does not mean 'without risk'.