A significant portion of the funds stolen from Kelp DAO is now frozen. On Monday night, Arbitrum's Security Council took decisive action to secure 30,766 ETH, worth around $71 million, by moving the funds into an intermediary wallet that can only be accessed through subsequent Arbitrum governance decisions.
The frozen funds are connected to Saturday's $292 million rsETH exploit. rsETH is a liquid restaking token issued by KelpDAO, representing a user's stake in restaked ether. Following input from law enforcement regarding the exploiter's identity, the Arbitrum Security Council executed the freeze without disrupting any Arbitrum users or applications. The transfer was completed at 11:26 p.m.
ET on April 20, as stated by Arbitrum on X, and the stolen funds are no longer controlled by the original address. This move recovers about a quarter of the total amount drained from Kelp's LayerZero-powered bridge on Saturday, when attackers exploited compromised verifier infrastructure to pull 116,500 rsETH.
The attack has been preliminarily attributed to North Korea's Lazarus Group by LayerZero. As a layer-2 blockchain built on top of Ethereum, Arbitrum's Security Council has emergency powers to take protective action in such scenarios. However, interventions on user funds at the governance level are rare and contentious due to the introduction of discretionary control over an otherwise permissionless network. The freeze provides Kelp with a partial recovery option, in addition to any further recoveries by law enforcement and chain-tracing firms.
It also intensifies the ongoing dispute between Kelp and LayerZero over liability for the exploit, as any broader distribution of remaining losses now has a $71 million offset before legal coordination, insurance, or treasury contributions are considered. Kelp is coordinating with ecosystem partners on a recovery fund and evaluating next steps on unpausing, loss socialization, and legal coordination with affected parties. The possibility of freezing additional stolen funds depends on the attacker's movements of rsETH or its derivatives before consolidation and whether other chains with similar emergency powers choose to act.