The Kelp DAO exploit has been partially mitigated. Arbitrum's Security Council has frozen approximately $71 million worth of ether, consisting of 30,766 ETH, by relocating the funds to an intermediary wallet. This wallet can only be accessed through additional governance actions. The frozen funds are connected to Saturday's $292 million rsETH exploit.

rsETH is a liquid restaking token representing a user's position in restaked ether. The Arbitrum Security Council took emergency action, with input from law enforcement regarding the exploiter's identity, to freeze the funds without impacting any users or applications on the Arbitrum network.

The transfer was completed on April 20 at 11:26 p.m. ET, as stated on Arbitrum's X statement.

This move has recovered about a quarter of the total amount drained from Kelp's LayerZero-powered bridge on Saturday. The attackers had exploited compromised verifier infrastructure to pull 116,500 rsETH, with LayerZero attributing the attack to North Korea's Lazarus Group with preliminary confidence. As a layer-2 blockchain, Arbitrum processes transactions more cheaply and settles them back to the main chain.

Its Security Council has emergency powers to take protective action in such scenarios, although governance-level interventions on user funds are rare and contentious due to the introduction of discretionary control over an otherwise permissionless network. The freeze provides Kelp with a partial recovery option, in addition to any potential recoveries by law enforcement and chain-tracing firms.

It also escalates the dispute between Kelp and LayerZero over responsibility for the exploit, as any broader socialization of remaining losses now has a $71 million offset before considering legal coordination, insurance, or treasury contributions. Kelp is coordinating with ecosystem partners on a recovery fund and evaluating next steps on unpausing, loss socialization, and legal coordination with affected counterparties. Whether more stolen funds can be frozen depends on the attacker's movement of rsETH or its derivatives before consolidation and whether other chains with similar emergency powers choose to act on their portions of the flow.