The aftermath of the KelpDAO hack has triggered a chain reaction in stablecoin markets, resulting in a significant borrowing spike on Aave. In the 24 hours following the attack, users borrowed around $300 million against their USDT deposits, according to data from Chaos Labs.

This surge in borrowing is not driven by demand, but rather by users' inability to withdraw their funds due to maxed-out stablecoin pools. As a result, depositors are taking out loans against their own assets at a loss, simply to access liquidity.

This phenomenon can be likened to a bank refusing to process customer withdrawal requests, prompting customers to take out loans on their deposits. The head of strategy at Spark, a rival DeFi lending platform, noted that the illiquidity in Aave's stablecoin markets has led to a $300 million increase in borrowing with USDT collateral.

To understand how the KelpDAO exploit led to this liquidity crisis on Aave, it's essential to grasp how the system is designed to work and where it failed. Aave is a decentralized finance protocol that enables users to lend and borrow cryptocurrencies without intermediaries. The platform operates on the assumption that there is always sufficient liquidity for lenders to withdraw their deposits and for borrowers to unwind their positions. However, when this assumption breaks down, the entire system is affected.

The KelpDAO exploit involved the manipulation of the protocol's bridge infrastructure, resulting in the release of 116,500 rsETH tokens, which were then used to borrow real ETH and other assets. The fake tokens were deposited into lending protocols, primarily Aave, to borrow real assets.

The borrowed assets are now gone, leaving the rsETH tokens, which are essentially worthless. Aave froze rsETH markets on V3 and V4, but this freeze also triggered a chain reaction that led to the $300 million borrowing surge. When the exploit was discovered, large investors withdrew billions of dollars' worth of cryptocurrencies from Aave's liquidity pools, draining the pools and causing utilization rates to reach 100%.

This meant that users could no longer withdraw their funds, prompting them to borrow against their locked deposits. The $300 million secondary borrowing surge began as trapped depositors, unable to withdraw their money, drew loans from their locked deposits.

This desperate act of borrowing against their own money at a loss has reduced liquidity in other markets, with USDC and USDe markets now also at 100% utilization. The incident highlights the risks associated with decentralized finance, demonstrating that 'decentralized' does not mean 'without risk'.