A significant portion of the Kelp DAO funds is now frozen. On Monday, Arbitrum's Security Council took action to secure 30,766 ETH, valued at approximately $71 million, by transferring it to an intermediary wallet.

This wallet can only be accessed through additional governance actions, effectively blocking the exploiter's control. The frozen funds are linked to the recent $292 million rsETH exploit that occurred on Saturday. rsETH is a liquid restaking token issued by KelpDAO, representing a user's position in restaked ether. The Arbitrum Security Council, with input from law enforcement regarding the exploiter's identity, executed the freeze without disrupting any Arbitrum users or applications.

The transfer was completed at 11:26 p.m. ET on April 20, as stated by Arbitrum. This move has recovered around a quarter of the total amount stolen from Kelp's LayerZero-powered bridge during the attack, in which 116,500 rsETH were exploited due to compromised verifier infrastructure.

LayerZero has attributed the attack to North Korea's Lazarus Group with preliminary confidence. As a layer-2 blockchain, Arbitrum processes transactions more affordably and settles them back to the main chain. Its Security Council possesses emergency powers to take protective measures in such scenarios, although interventions on user funds at the governance level are rare and contentious due to the introduction of discretionary control over a permissionless network.

The freeze provides Kelp with a partial recovery option, in addition to any further recoveries law enforcement and chain-tracing firms can achieve. It also heightens the ongoing dispute between Kelp and LayerZero regarding responsibility for the exploit, as any broader distribution of the remaining losses now has a $71 million offset before legal coordination, insurance, or treasury contributions are considered. Kelp is coordinating with ecosystem partners on a recovery fund and evaluating next steps on unpausing, loss socialization, and legal coordination with affected counterparties. The possibility of freezing more stolen funds depends on the attacker's movements of rsETH or its derivatives before consolidation and whether other chains with similar emergency powers choose to act on their portions of the flow.